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Abstract
Article 38 of the 2000 Palermo Convention sets out that the Convention will enter into force after a 
minimum requirement of ratifying or acceding States are fulfilled that is 40 countries. The Indonesian 
Government had signed the Palermo Convention on December 12, 2000 and had continued to ratify 
on April 20, 2009. Here the debate begins in regard with the legal status of the Convention that 
has been ratified by the Indonesia Government, whether the Convention applies for Indonesia or in 
Indonesia. In the era of Professor Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, treaties that had been ratified or acceded 
by the Indonesian Government would ipso facto be enforceable in Indonesia, therefore academics and 
practitioners convinced that Indonesia was a monist State even though in practice it never showed it. 
That Indonesia has been running the monism concept, I have repeatedly argued through my writings. 
It is because the constitutional law experts have defined and described some terms in a wrong way, 
such as the meaning of ratification of the Vienna Convention 1969, of approval of Parliament under 
Article 11 of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, of ratification act set out by Law Nr. 24 of 2000 in 
regard with International Treaties as well as the meaning of self-executing and non-self-executing 
treaties. This paper would like to propose a different point of view on the practice of the Indonesian 
legal system in regard with treaties, especially the legal status of the 2000 Palermo Convention in 
our legal system. In addition to it, this paper also would like to identify the difference between the 
international obligations burdened by Indonesia as a State party, with the direct application of the 
Convention in our national courts, which unfortunately those two concepts are often associated with 
each other.
Keywords: The Palermo Convention, monism-dualism, Indonesian practice
I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2000 the Government of Indonesia has signed the Pal-
ermo Convention 2000 on Trans-Organized Crimes known as the Unit-
ed Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. The Indone-
sian Government takes approximately 9 years to ratify the Convention 
on April 20, 2009 through Act No. 5 of 2009. From some teachings in 
the course of international law and international treaty, it seems that 
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there is confusion addressing the significance of the ratification of the 
treaty by the Indonesian Government. It is because there is a very strong 
doctrine attaching in people’s mind that the ratification act is assumed 
as the implementing legislation of treaty in Indonesia. The ratification 
law contains only two articles with the treaty enclosed. According to 
constitutional law experts, by enclosing the treaty in the ratification 
act it means a ratified treaty can directly be implemented in Indonesia 
[read: court]. Most of international law lecturers deem that Indonesia 
adopts the monism concept despite the fact that none of treaty provi-
sions has been applied by judges as legal basis. This misunderstanding 
is due to their perplexity to conceive between the concept of monism 
and international obligations burdened to states parties.
In PILC 2013 conducted at Faculty of Law Universitas Padjadjaran, 
Bandung I strongly criticized the Delri’s report to the UN Committee 
on Human Rights in regard with the use of Article 2 of the ICCPR as an 
example that international treaty is part of our national law so it can di-
rectly be applied in our municipal courts. The Article 2 of the Covenant 
is actually not an article that can be provided as a legal basis because 
the existence of the article simply wants to describe the legal status of 
the Covenant for the states parties, which the states parties are required 
to enact legislation that can make the rights contained in the Covenant 
have legal effect in national level.
The Indonesian Government often feels uncertain when it comes 
to ratify a treaty due to its understanding that the treaty provisions will 
apply in Indonesia [read: court]. In fact, ratification has no meaning 
whatsoever, except to make the treaty enter into force in internation-
al level. In addition, the Indonesian Government is entitled to declare 
about the meaning of Indonesia’s ratification of a treaty. The Colombian 
Government when ratifying the Rome Statue expressly declared that 
“none of the provisions of the Rome Statute alters the domestic law ap-
plied by the Colombian judicial authorities in exercise of their domestic 
jurisdiction within the territory of the Republic of Colombia.” On the 
top of that, Uruguay, in regard to the Rome Statute, boldly declared 
that ““...Uruguay shall ensure its application to the full of extent of 
the powers of the State insofar as it is competent in that respect and in 
strict accordance with the Constitutional provisions of the Republic.” 
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This declaration reaped many objections from other state parties of the 
Rome Statute because the Uruguay Government was considered not to 
have a sincere commitment as a party to the Rome Statute. The question 
arises when the Indonesian Government ratifies the Palermo Conven-
tion, whether the Convention applies in Indonesia or for Indonesia. This 
paper will discuss a few things with regard to the meaning of ratifica-
tion in our constitutional system, ratification law of a treaty and the 
distinction between international obligations and the monism concept.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TREATY IN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM: 
FROM THE ERA OF PROFESSOR MOCHTAR KUSUMAAT-
MADJA UNTIL TODAY
The politics of law of the law of treaty in Indonesia is very interesting 
to be discussed because there is a very different view amongst constitu-
tional law and international law experts in dealing with the application 
of treaties in our legal system. Our Constitution does not explicitly regu-
late the intercourse between international law and municipal law. Article 
11 of the Constitution only regulates the relation between the President 
and the DPR in terms of making treaties with other states. Therefore, 
the question arises whether judiciary may use the rules of international 
law in their courts. Judges seemingly are reluctant to apply the rules of 
international law to resolve matters because they reckon that they are 
not obliged to implement the rules. The reluctance may be very reason-
able when we refer to the case of NMB v. PT. Nizwar closely in regard 
with the applicability of the 1927 Geneva Convention to Indonesia after 
the independence proclamation.1
 
There were two major opinions arise 
regarding this Geneva Convention, first opined that international agree-
ments concluded by the Kingdom of the Netherlands remained in effect 
for Indonesia since the Indonesian Government did not withdraw from 
the agreements.2
 
Then, second assumed that the Indonesian Government 
was no longer bound by the international agreements.3
In the case of PT. Nizwar, Indonesia seemed to adopt a monism 
1 Sudargo Gautama, Indonesia dan Arbitrase Internasonal (Bandung: Alumni, 1992) 
hlm, 314
2 Ibid, p 68
3 Ibid.
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concept because the National Court of Central Jakarta through its deci-
sion Nr. 228 of 1979 dated June 10, 1981 recognised the 1927 Geneva 
Convention to apply in Indonesia without an implementing legisla-
tion. However, the decision was annulled by the Supreme Court on the 
grounds of the existence of the Presidential Decree Nr. 34 of 1981 did 
not make the 1927 Geneva Convention applicable in Indonesia prior 
to the enactment of an implementing legislation. The interpretation of 
the Supreme Court at the time turned out to be in line with the Consti-
tutional Court decision Nr. 33/PUU-IX/2011 regarding judicial review 
of the ASEAN Charter, that the ratification law issued by the DPR did 
not make treaties enforceable in Indonesia since it is merely a formal 
approval of the DPR to the President that wants to ratify a treaty. Thus, 
the Geneva Convention only applied to Indonesia as a state.
The term of “implementing legislation” or “legislative action” is 
interpreted a bit different than what it appears in the Law Nr. 24 of 2000 
on Treaties, especially Article 9 paragraph 2 which states “ratification 
of a treaty as referred to paragraph 1 shall be made by an act or a presi-
dential decree.” The term “presidential decree” was then changed to be 
“presidential rule” due to the emergence of Law Nr. 12 of 2011 on the 
Formation of Law. The existence of Article 9 paragraph 1 of the Law 
Nr. 24 of 2000 is actually contrary to Article 11 of the Indonesian Con-
stitution due to the need of the involvement of the DPR to give approval 
to the President before ratifying a treaty. Implementing legislation is a 
product of the DPR to elaborate the norms of international law in order 
to be applicable in our municipal courts, such as the Berne Convention 
that was approved through a Presidential Decree Nr. 19 of 1997 was 
applied in our legal system through Law Nr. 19 of 2002 on Copyright. 
Unfortunately, in regard with the 1958 New York Convention on For-
eign Arbitral Awards, the Supreme Court misunderstood the meaning 
of an implementing legislation by issuing the Supreme Court Rule Nr. 
1 of 1990 as the implementing legislation of the New York Convention. 
In fact, the implementing legislation of the Convention was actually 
the Law Nr. 30 of 1999 on Indonesian National Board of Arbitration in 
which governs the recognition and the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards.
Professor Harjono’s dissertation stated that the Presidential Letter 
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Nr. 2826/HK/1960 was the result of Article 11 interpretation conducted 
by the Executive. The word “interpretation” becomes false if we look at 
the doctrine of separation of powers in regard with who has the author-
ity to interpret laws. It is the authority of the judiciary, not the Executive 
branch.4Moreover, the word of “pengesahan” in Article 9 paragraph 2 
of the Law Nr. 24 of 2000 leads to a contradiction understanding associ-
ated with the word “ratification” therefore some understandings deem 
that the authority to ratify a treaty be at the DPR, not the President.
In addition to it, there was a shifting understanding in regard with 
self-executing and non-self-executing in Indonesia so as to cause quar-
rels amongst academics and practitioners. So far, the self-executing 
treaty is understood as the entry into force of an international treaty 
only requires a signature, while the non-self-executing treaty is defined 
as the entry into force of an international treaty requires ratification. 
The emergence of these two definitions in academic is very astonish-
ing because these definitions are rather far from the initial definition 
of these emerging concepts. The self-executing and non-self-executing 
treaties originally appeared for the first time in the US. Article 6 of the 
US Constitution states that “...all Treaties are the supreme law of the 
Land.” Then a question arised within judges was whether all the inter-
national treaties ratified by the US Government shall be applied direct-
ly in municipal courts. In Foster case, the definition of self-executing 
treaty came up when Justice Marshall said that “a self-executing treaty 
if the application of a treaty without the aid of legislation.”5Thus, it was 
described further by Vazquez in relation to the US legal system that “a 
self-executing treaty is defined as a treaty that may be enforced in mu-
nicipal courts without the prior legislation by the Congress.”6
 
In a case 
a treaty is considered as a non-self- executing when it cannot be directly 
implemented in national courts due to the requirement of an implement-
ing legislation. The court will refuse to apply treaty provisions if the 
provisions are regarded as non-self-executing. In Whitney v. Robert-
4 Harjono, 1994, Aspek-Aspek Yuridis Pembuatan Perjanjian Internasional dalam 
Sistem UUD 1945, (Disertasi, Universitas Airlangga, pp. 256-259.
5 Malvina Haberstam, 2000, International Human Rights and Domestic Law Focusing 
on U.S. Law with Some Reference to Israeli Law, 8 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 225, 
Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, p. 234.
6 Carlos Manuel Vazquez, 1995, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 
American Journal of International Law, Volume 89, Issue 4, p. 695.
543Volume 12 Number 4 July 2015
Palermo Convention in Our Legal System: Part of Our National Law or Merely a Source of Law
son, the US Supreme Court decided that “when the treaty stipulations 
are not self-executing they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation 
to carry them into effect...”7
The different comprehension on self-executing and non-self-exe-
cuting treaty in Indonesia finally creates an error to interpret whether a 
ratified treaty shall apply in Indonesia or to Indonesia. Basically, It did 
not err when people thought Indonesia adopted the monism concept 
because I at first thought it so when we looked back to the checks and 
balances system in our constitutional system. Looking at the checks 
and balances system operated in the US constitutional system in regard 
with treaties, the US President needs to have approval from the US 
Senate in order to ratify a treaty. The approval of the US Senate has 
two meanings, first to let the President ratify the treaty and to make 
the treaty enforceable in US courts unless otherwise determined by the 
Senate.8For instance, the President with the approval of the Senate rati-
fied the ICCPR. In the process of approval, the Senate put some con-
ditions, which were to make a reservation for Article 6 para 5 and to 
declare that the ICCPR would not create a private cause of action in US 
courts.9
 
In Domingues case, ICCPR was used to challenge the decision 
of Nevada Court due to give a death sentence to Domingues who was 
aged not yet 18 years old. The death sentence was inappropriate with 
the ICCPR that had been ratified by the US Government. However, the 
appeal was rejected by the Nevada Supreme Court on the grounds that 
the US Government has reserved the Article 6 para 5 of the Covenant 
and the ICCPR was regarded as a non-self-executing treaty. Therefore, 
the court handed down the death sentence was considered lawful.10
 
In 
Indonesia the implementation of the checks and balances system in 
term of process of ratifying treaty is similar, but it becomes very differ-
ent in regard with the legal consequences of the DPR approval to the 
7 David Sloss, 1999, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-
Executing Declaration and Human Rights Treaties, 24 Yale J. Int’l. L. 129, Yale Jour-
nal of International Law, p. 146.
8 Jordan J. Paust et.al., 2000, International Law and Litigation in the U.S., West Group, 
USA, pp. 219-220.
9 Chrissy Fox, 2003, Implication of the U.S.’ Reservations and NSE Declaration to 
the ICCPR for Capital Offenders and Foreign Relations, Comments, 11 Tul. J. Int’l. 
& Comp. L. 303, Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, pp. 304-308.
10 Ibid., p. 319.
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treaty. The DPR approval does not make the treaty enforceable in our 
legal system, but it is merely a formal form from the DPR to permit the 
President to ratify treaty.
Although Indonesia was colonized by the Dutch that adopts the mo-
nism concept, but the fact prevailing in Indonesia is the dualism concept. 
The evidence of Indonesia as a dualist state can viewed from the absent 
of our Constitution to regulate the legal status of treaties in our national 
legal system. Unlike monist states they clearly set out the status of trea-
ties in their constitutions, such as Article 611
 
of the US Constitution, Ar-
ticle 5512
 
of the 1958 French Constitution, Article 9413
 
of Grundwet and 
Article 15 paragraph 414of the Russian Constitution. Furthermore, there 
are countries that do not regulate the legal status of treaties due to the 
primacy of their national law, such as Australia, Canada and Germany. 
For Germany, this state put the international customary law higher than 
international treaties. The customary law can directly be implemented 
in its national courts, however the treaties must go through a transfor-
mation process in order to enforce.15
 
According to these countries, the 
act of ratification is merely binding upon the states in the international 
level, not in the national level. If Hj. Suparti Hadhyono stated that our 
judges were not bound by treaty provisions it is false because the judges 
in reality are not bound by treaty provisions made by the Executive. 
Our judges are only bound by laws enacted by the DPR. Therefore, the 
international law is only as a source of law for the judges.16
11 “All...treaties are the supreme law of the land.”
12 “Treaties and agreements duly ratified or approved shall upon publication prevail 
over Acts of Parliament...”
13 “Statutory legislations in force within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such 
application is in conflict with provisions of the treaties that are binding on all persons 
or resolutions by international organization.”
14 “The general recognized principles and norms of international law and the inter-
national treaties of the Russian Federation shall constitute part of its legal system. If 
an international treaty of the Russian Federation established other rules than those 
stipulated by the law, the rules of international treaty shall apply.”
15 Hasil penelitian Penulis ketika menulis disertasi hukum yang berjudul “Perjanjian 
Internasional Self-Executing dan Non-Self Executing di Pengadilan Nasional”, pada 
Sekolah Pascasarjana Fakultas Hukum Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta.
16 Hj. Suparti Hadhyono, “Praktek Penerapan Perjanjian Internasional dalam Putusan 
Hakim”, at http://www.scribd.com
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In the ratification Act it contains only two articles which the second 
article states that “the Act applies on the date of enactment.” Some legal 
scholars gives different comments on the word “apply” that indicates 
that the Act makes the ratified treaty have the force of law in Indone-
sia. Other comments express their opinion that the word “apply” means 
that the Act is a legal basis for the President to ratify the treaty. By 
understanding the constitutitional system and the separation of powers 
doctrine in Indonesia, we are deemed as a dualist state where ratified 
treaties will not be directly applicable in our municipal courts or in 
other words all treaties are regarded as non-self-executing in Indonesia. 
Article 7 of the Law Nr 12 of 2011 shows the process of transformation 
must be carried out in order to make ratified treaties enforce. Moreover, 
the ratification Act is actually addressed to the President and the DPR 
when they are enacting laws they shall recall the ratified treaty norms to 
be applied in the national level, such as the UN Convention on Climate 
Change that was ratified by Ratification Act Nr. 6 of 1994, its treaty 
norms were embodied on the Law Nr. 32 of 2009 on the Environmental 
Protection and Management.
III. RATIFICATION OF TREATY AS THE CONSENT TO BE 
BOUND OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
Steps in the making of international agreements are negotiation, 
signing and ratification or accession. In the case of consent to be bound 
of treaty,17
 
the consent to be bound of states to treaties can be conducted 
in many ways, such as signature, signature ad referendum and ratifica-
tion or accession.18
 
According to Starke, the legal consequences of sign-
ing a treaty are very dependent on whether the treaty requires ratification 
or not. If so, the signing states approve the substance of the treaty and 
the states are bound by Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.19The 
applicability of signing a treaty will be divergent when the treaty does 
not require ratification. According to Oppenheim, “although ratification 
17 Boer Mauna, 2001, Hukum Internasional: Pengertian, Peranan, dan Fungsi dalam 
Era Dinamika Global, Alumni, Bandung, pp. 83-84.
18 Rebecca Wallace, 1992, International Law, 2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
p. 222.
19 J.G. Starke, 1984, Introduction to International Law, Butterworth, London, p. 429.
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is necessary in principle but not always essential.”20
 
Then Schwarzen-
berger also argues that “if the treaty is not subject to ratification, the 
signature necessarily also serves the additional purpose of expressing 
the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty.”21
In Canada ratification of international treaties does not have any 
legal consequences in municipal courts before implementing legislation 
enacted by the Federal or Provincial Parliament of Canada.22
 
In terms 
of making and implementing international agreements, the Canadian 
constitutional system divides two major powers, which are the Execu-
tive and the Legislature. The Federal Executive Government may abide 
to any international treaties. However they cannot make sure whether 
or not the ratified treaties become part of national law of Canada. The 
reason is due to the differentiation of the state obligations in interna-
tional and national level, where the international obligations are im-
posed on the Executive Government and the authorization to make laws 
lay on the Parliament either federal or province. 23
 
In case of Labor 
Convention, the Canadian Government entered into agreement of three 
Conventions at an International Labor Conference, in which the legal 
impacts of the ILO Conventions were to the provincial governments 
therefore the provincial governments are entitled to enact implementing 
legislations to make the Convention norms enforceable in Canada. As 
said by Lord Atkins that “Where the subject matter of a treaty comes 
within provincial legislative competence, only province may enact im-
plementing legislation.”24
On this issue, the Indonesian Government has ratified the Palermo 
20 H. Lauterpacht, 1948, Oppenheim’s International Law: A Treatise, Vol. I – Peace, 
Longmans, Green and Co., London-NY-Toronto, p. 815.
21 Georg Schwarzenberger, 1951, Power Politics: A Study of International Society, 
Frederick A. Praeger, New York, p. 144.
22 Christopher Harland, Domestic Reception of International Humanitarian Law: U.K. 
and Canadian Implementing Legislations, in Christopher P.M. Walters (Ed.), 2006, 
British and Canadian Perpectives on International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden/Boston, p. 29.
23 Melanie Mallet, A Primer on Treaty Making and Treaty Implementation in Canada, 
Original Contribution, Thanks to Prof. Magnet, p. 2. 
24 George Slyz, 1997, International Law in National Courts, 28 NYU J. Int’l. & Pol. 
65, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, p. 82.
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Convention through the Law Nr. 5 of 2009. As having been explained 
before the ratification Act was not the form of transformation of ratified 
treaties in Indonesia, but the Act was the form of formal approval from 
the DPR to the President to ratify international treaties. The Palermo 
Convention is merely applied to Indonesia as a State where the Indo-
nesian Government has an obligation to carry out international obliga-
tion mandated by the Convention. Article 1 of the Palermo Convention 
explains that the purpose of this Convention is to promote coopera-
tion amongst countries in order to combat trans-organized crimes. The 
Convention also requires the state parties to take legislative measure in 
order to penalize types of crimes set forth in the Convention, such as 
money laundering, corruption, and other crimes. The Indonesian Gov-
ernment has enacted legislations in relation with the Convention such 
as money laundering, corruption, extradition, protection on witnesses 
and victims.
IV. CONDUCTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF TREA-
TIES IS NOT THE SAME AS THE MONISM CONCEPT
In some discussions with legal scholars, it appears that there is an 
overlapping understanding in regard with performing international ob-
ligations with the monism concept. At the time a State respects the im-
munity rights of diplomatic staff set in the 1961 Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, there is an assumption that Indonesia is a monist 
state. However, I have a different point of view that Indonesia is not 
showing the monism practices but merely performing the international 
obligations on the basis of reciprocity with other countries. Similarly, 
when an state officer will be assigned to a diplomatic post and had to 
transit in a third state, the transit state shall perform the obligation set 
forth in Article 40 of the 1961 Vienna Convention to respect the im-
munity right and privileges of the diplomatic agent. In criminal or civil 
cases involving foreign diplomatic officials, our judges are not bound by 
the 1961 Vienna Convention, but are bound by Article 9 of Indonesian 
Criminal Code which states that “The application of Articles 2, 5, 7 and 
8 are limited by exceptions that are recognised in international law.”
Similarly, when the Indonesian Government allows foreign ships to 
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navigate in our territorial sea with the right of innocent passage, it does 
not mean that Indonesia is running the monism concept. However Indo-
nesia as a State is performing its international obligation to open its ter-
ritorial waters for foreign ships to sail peacefully. If Indonesia does not 
carry out the international obligations imposed by the 1982 UNCLOS 
then other countries may submit an objection or claim to the ICJ. The 
main actor of implementing the obligations is the Executive that has the 
authority to make external affairs.
In contrast, the monism concept is related to whether or not a treaty 
can be directly applied in national courts of a state. 25
 
According to 
Grotius, the law of nations is the law that is universal and binding on all 
mankind. 26
 
The unification of national law and international law in one 
pyramid of legal system will make the international law automatically 
becomes part of the national law of states that once the ratification ac-
tion taken the treaty will be an integral part of the national legal system 
of the State. 27
 
Interestingly, the monism concept is divided into two 
mainstreams, which are the monism concept with primacy on national 
law and with primacy on international law. According to the first main-
stream, treaty norms are elaborated into national law of each state so 
that even though the main source of law is the national law but it is not 
contrary to the norms of international law. Thus, the second one thinks 
that the international law is placed in the highest order in the hierarchy 
of law. 28
Basically, the question whether or not treaty can be applied directly 
in courts is a question that must be answered by the state itself. As noted 
above, in order to understand whether or not a state adopts the monism 
concept it can be observed from the state constitutions. Unfortunately, 
the understanding that in monist states all treaties can be directly ap-
plied in their courts is not true because not all treaties in fact can be 
directly applied. The courts need to analysis whether or not the treaty 
norms bind individuals, as practiced in the Netherlands and France. Al-
25 Jacob Dolinger, 1993, Brazilian Supreme Court Solutions for Conflict Between Do-
mestic and International Law: An Exercise in Eclecticism, 22 Cap. U. L. Rev. 1041, 
Capital University Law Review, p. 1045.
26 George Slyz, op.cit., p. 69.
27 Alina Kaczorowska, 2002, Public International Law, Old Bailey Press, p. 36.
28 Ibid
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though the courts consider that the treaty norms can be directly imple-
mented the courts need to observe the ratification process whether or 
not there is reservations or declaration toward the treaty concerned, as 
practiced in the US.
V. THE PALERMO CONVENTION CONCLUDED BY THE EX-
ECUTIVE, BUT JUDGES FOLLOW LAWS ENACTED BY 
THE LEGISLATURE
Philosophically we realize that treaty norms only provide the rights 
and obligations to states parties. From the separation of powers system 
it is clear and firm that the municipal courts are only bound by the laws 
enacted by the Legislature. Some states clearly explain that ratifica-
tion of a treaty does not provide any benefit for the state in the national 
level until the Legislature approves and enacts the law to transform the 
treaty norms concerned such as Canada. For countries giving primacy 
to national law, the enforceability of treaty norms requires a process of 
transformation. The reason why international law in nature is non-self- 
executing it is because the view of national law and international law is 
different in every way as well as the different function of the Executive 
and the Legislature.
In several countries such as UK and Australia, the separation of 
powers is properly enforced. In UK the power to make treaty lays on 
the Executive branch, including negotiation, signature and ratification, 
without the involvement of the Parliament. However, the ratified treaty 
has never been part of UK national law without the implementation leg-
islation enacted by the Parliament. UK judges only adhere to laws en-
acted by the Parliament and the judges do not have authority to review 
any law or to declare the law is unconstitutional because the power to 
declare so is the Parliament itself. 29
 
The judges also do not have any au-
thority to make “second-guess legislation” or interpreting the law with-
out consulting first with the Parliament as the lawmaker. The doctrine 
of Parliament sovereignty makes ratified treaties to enforce without the 
Parliament’s consent. 30 Similarly in Australia, the separation of powers 
29 Aalt Willem & Philipp Kiiver, 2007, Constitutional Compared: An Introduction to 
Comparative Constitutional Law, Intersentia, Antwerpen, p. 108.
30 Michael Bogdan, 1994, Comparative Law, Kluwer Law and Taxation, Norstedts 
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doctrine is also the reason to not implement treaty norms in municipal 
courts. All ratified treaties will need implementing legislations to be ap-
plicable. In terms of implementing legislation, Australia runs a unique 
way where the implementing legislation needs to have a clause saying 
that “have the force of law in Australia” in order to the treaty norms 
be applicable in national level. Another clause shows that a treaty can 
be implemented in courts is “This Act was intended in particular to 
make the provisions to give effect to the Convention.” For instance, 
the Genocide Convention Act 1949 (Cth) is the implementing legis-
lation of the Genocide Convention, but the presence of this Act was 
not intended to make the Genocide Convention apply in courts, but it 
was only approval from the Commonwealth Parliament to the Austra-
lian Government that had ratified the Convention. 31
 
In making treaties, 
the Government does not receive any intervention from the Parliament 
as said by Gareth Evans that “The Constitutional power to enter into 
treaties is one that belongs to the Governor-General in Council. The 
Commonwealth Parliament, inconsequence, has no formal function to 
exercise by way of review or oversight of international conventions, 
treaties and agreements which the Federal Government is considering 
signing.” 32
 
Moreover, the legal effect of the ratification of international 
agreements binds the Australian Government but it did not provide the 
rights and obligations to the Australian citizens. 33
 
In case of Victoria v. 
Commonwealth the applicant provided the ratified ILO Convention but 
then the High Court of Australia answered as follow: “Thus, as matters 
stand in Australian... the conduct of the external affairs by the Execu-
tive may produce agreement which the Executive wishes to translate 
into the domestic or municipal legal order. To do so, it must procure 
the passage of legislation implementing those agreements if it wishes 
to create individual rights and obligations or change existing rights and 
Juridik & Tano, Sweden, pp. 124-125.
31 Rosalie Balkin, International Law and Domestic Law, in San Blay et.al. (Ed.), 2005, 
Public International Law: An Australian Perspective, 2nd Edition, Oxford University 
Press, pp. 124-125.
32 Suri Ratnapala, 2002, Australian Constitutional Law: Foundation and Theory, Ox-
ford University Press, Victoria, p. 33.
33 Gareth Evan, 1995, International Treaties: Their Impact on Australia, A Speech on 
the International Treaties Conference, Canberra, Australia, at http://www.australian-
politics.com/foreign/treaties/85-09-04treaties- evans.shtml
551Volume 12 Number 4 July 2015
Palermo Convention in Our Legal System: Part of Our National Law or Merely a Source of Law
obligations under that legal order.” 34
One of the reasons why Indonesian judges does not apply treaty 
norms in their courts is because the separation of powers doctrine in 
which the ratified treaty only binds Indonesia as a State in regards with 
international relations. In addition, the judges are only bound by laws 
enacted by the Legislature or DPR. In reality, the judges have freedom 
to do legal interpretation of rules of law if they are deemed incompatible 
with ratified treaties, however this is rarely done. The Palermo Conven-
tion does not have legal effects in national level until its implementing 
legislation made by the DPR. In fact, the Indonesian Government has 
anticipated the rise of trans-national crimes by issuing some relevant 
laws, such as trafficking, money laundering, corruption, extradition, 
terrorism and other several laws that are relevant to the Convention.
VI. CONCLUSION
The implementation of treaties in Indonesia has always been an in-
teresting debate amongst legal scholars in the field of constitutional law 
and international law. The debate topic is always whether Indonesia 
adopts monism or dualism concept. The debate then develops to the 
legal consequences of ratification treaties, the separation of powers and 
the divergent between applying international obligations and the mo-
nism concept.
From the description above it can be drawn that the dualism concept 
is more dominant to be implemented in our legal system by looking at 
the Constitution and Article 7 of the Law Nr 12 of 2011 on the Forma-
tion of Law. Furthermore, the ratification of treaty is an international act 
of Indonesia in conjunction with other countries and aims to create the 
treaty to apply universally. The act of ratification to the Palermo Con-
vention does not make the Convention applicable in Indonesia [read: 
court], but for Indonesia. The applicability of the Palermo Convention 
in national level very much depends on the DPR to enact an implement-
ing legislation. This is caused the doctrine of separation of powers in 
regard with the authority to make laws. Therefore, judges are not bound 
by treaties made by the Executive, but by laws enacted by the DPR. In 
34 Ibid., p. 124.
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term of international obligations, any treaty always assign to states par-
ties to adhere and to apply international obligations under each treaty 
so that the treaty norms become effective and applicable. One of the 
international obligations lying under the Palermo Convention is that all 
states parties shall take any legislative measures to make the provisions 
in the Palermo Convention have the force of law. The Indonesian Gov-
ernment together with the DPR has an obligation to enact any laws that 
are relevant to the Convention. Some of Acts of Parliament have been 
enacted to fulfill its obligations toward the Palermo Convention, such 
as terrorism, corruption, extradition, money laundering and trafficking. 
Carrying out the international obligations of treaty is the not the same as 
the concept of monism due to different legal consequences. Therefore, 
it errs if there is suspicion that ratification of treaty is to make the treaty 
enforceable in Indonesia [read: court], however it applies to Indonesia 
as a state.
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